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ILLUSIONS OF JUSTICE: WHO REPRESENTS
THE VICTIM?
JUDITH ROWLAND*
The first time I stood up at a criminal proceeding as a private
attorney to announce my presence on behalf of a crime victim's
family, I was met with a mixture of curiosity and puzzlement.
As a prosecutor, I had for years been free to speak, to advise,
and to recommend. My opinion was sought in court and my turn
to express outrage at the criminal and his crime always came.
There was always a place for me at the table past the swinging
gate. I could walk through that hallowed space in front of the
judge called "the well," and if the courtroom was locked when I
arrived, I knocked and an armed bailiff always let me in.
Now, I felt so out of place as an attorney for crime victims. I
had to wait in the courthouse hallway with the family after being
told that only prosecutors and defense attorneys could enter
before 9:00 a.m. I sat in the spectators' section beside my clients
while the prosecutor and defense attorney held session in the
judge's chambers. And I stood behind the swinging gate, on the
outside.
Were not these victims and families just like the ones I had
spent hours with as a prosecutor, either on the phone or in my
office, explaining the process, preparing them to be witnesses,
with whom I had laughed and almost cried? I "represented"
them, didn't I?
Sure, the state was my employer, and I always reminded jurors
that, unlike the defense attorney who had a living, breathing per-
son at the counsel table, my client would not fit in a chair, but was
* B.A., University of California at Berkeley; J.D., California Western University School
of Law. Ms. Rowland is the founder and director of California Crime Victims Legal Clinic,
San Diego, CA, the only law firm in the country to exclusively represent victims as clients.
She is the author of the book The Ultimate Violation: Rape Trauma Syndrome: An Answer for
Victims, Justice in the Courtroom (Doubleday 1985), and is currently working on a new book,
Illusions of Justice. Among the many awards received by Ms. Rowland is the prestigious
Foundation for the Improvement of Justice Award.
ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
'present' nonetheless. And in the final analysis, when the dust set-
tled, wasn't my success measured by the conviction, and wasn't
that "success" for the victim, too?
In the years since I left the prosecutor's office and began repre-
senting crime victims, some things about the criminal justice sys-
tem have become more clear, while others have not.
It is clear that a prosecutor represents the public in general, and
the state in particular. It is clear that a prosecutor carries absolute
discretion in exercising the power to arrest, to prosecute or plea,
to settle or dismiss. It is also clear that a victim of a crime is not a
designated player, or "party," in the legal rule book. Only the de-
fendant and the prosecutor "have an interest" in the criminal jus-
tice arena, which gives them "standing." Lastly, it is clear that
there is unrest far and wide among citizens, of whom some 35
million are crime victims.' Their collective voice should be deaf-
ening, but unfortunately it officially cannot be heard.
What is less clear is how this happened; how we as a nation got
to this place. Has the criminal justice system always had this rule
book? Has the victim's role always been as a nonparty witness? If
so, why? If not, can we change it? And should we?
Logic certainly dictates that a crime victim has an "interest" in
the criminal justice process to which he or she must respond when
called. Logic tells us that something is not right when the victim is
not consulted about what happens to the person who raped them,
or killed their child while driving drunk, or left them wheelchair-
bound after being shot during a robbery. After all, it is the victim
who is raped, not the state; it is the drunk driving victim's family
whose insurance rates go up, not the state's; and it is the paraple-
gic, not the state, who can no longer work as a mailman.
My training in the law has taught me that "logic" can be subjec-
tive, depending upon who is calling the plays, and for what team.
"Justice," on the other hand, is held to a higher standard, and is
the scale upon which the results should be weighed.
What I have discovered is that "things" have not always been as
1 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTIC REPORTS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VIcTMIZA-
TION IN THE U.S.: 1991 PRELIMINARY REPORT 3 (1992) (giving various statistics regarding
crime victims); see also America Speaks Out: Citizens' Attitudes About Victims' Rights and Vio-
lence, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Nat'l Victims Center, New York, N.Y.), Apr. 18, 1991, at 4
[hereinafter America Speaks Out] (almost 4 out of 10 Americans (39%) have been direct or
indirect victims of violent crime).
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they are today, but rather we seem to have simply accepted them
as universal truths. We have, in fact, merely tipped the balance of
justice from one extreme to another.
Historically, crime victims were very much a part of the crimi-
nal justice process. When wronged, the entire clan responded to
the "hue and cry" of the injured.2 Consequences were immediate
and the course of justice was swift. Later, as the state began to
involve itself in the criminal justice system, it "was often to regu-
late . . .. private vengeance, not displace it." s Trial by combat
served as a substitute for the old-fashioned brawl, like the gentle-
men's duel and the shoot-out at high noon.4
Why, then, do we now find ourselves locked into a system in
which a public prosecutor representing the state is the collective
voice which speaks for crime victims in the criminal justice
system?
The answer is puzzling. Our legal heritage is derived for the
most part from English common law, which has for centuries been
firmly rooted in a process of private prosecution.5 This concept is
based on the seemingly obvious premise that the victim is the per-
son actually injured. This practice was prevalent as recently as the
opening of the Western frontier.6 Somewhere between old Eng-
land and modern America, something went awry.
No one is certain exactly how the system of public prosecution
emerged. It is known, however, that these changes began during
the American Colonial period when the young nation's demo-
cratic-minded countrymen needed unity against a common for-
2 See J.L. BARKAS, VICrIMS 172-73 (1978) (describing historical involvement of victim and
victim's family in punishing offenders); see also Leslie Sebba, The Victim's Role in the Penal
Process: A Theoretical Orientation, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 217, 225 (1982) (in early penal systems
justice was carried out by victim or victim's clan).
3 Richard L. Aynes, Constitutional Considerations: Government Responsibility and the Right
Not To Be a Victim, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 63, 72 (1984).
' See id. (discussing evolution of present criminal justice system to point where state con-
trolled punishment of crime).
5 See Paul S. Hudson, The Crime Victim and the Criminal Justice System: Time for a Change,
11 PEPP. L. REV. 23, 23-26 (1984) (discussing transition from private prosecution to state
dominance); see also Josephine Gittler, Expanding the Role of the Victim in a Criminal Action:
An Overview of Issues and Problems, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 117, 125-27 (1984) (discussing move-
ment toward increased role of state in criminal prosecution).
6 The image we have of justice in the old West is that when a crime was committed, they
locked the suspect up until the circuit judge arrived. Generally, there was no formal prose-
cutor. The judge heard from everyone, including victims, witnesses, and the defendant,
and then decided a "fair" outcome.
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eign enemy.7 This concept of group unity carried over into the
courts. As the state took more and more control over the criminal
process, it indicated to the victim that the injury was to both the
state and the victim, and that the state would act on the victim's
behalf.'
In addition to being told that their injury really belonged to the
state, crime victims watched their last link to a participatory role
in the criminal justice system-restitution-slip away." With the
advent of the penitentiary following the American Revolution,
prison became the prevailing penalty for many crimes." Gone
were a variety of other sanctions, including restitution, which pre-
viously had subjected the offender to a more separate accountabil-
ity. The transformation was then complete, and crime victims
were no longer considered to have an interest in the criminal jus-
tice process.
Today, as we stand poised on the threshold of the twenty-first
century, we find that "what was once a private matter [has] be-
come[] the business of strangers to be handled mainly as they see
fit" for the greater good of the state." This is, at best, a breach of
the initial agreement under which the state became a partner in
the criminal justice process. It also ignores the very real personal
interest victims have in both being protected by the state and in
having their rights vindicated by the criminal process.
It is ironic that one suspected of a crime enjoys the right to
receive physical protection from the government, while the law-
abiding citizen is not entitled to such protection. Citizens are told
that unless there exists a "special relationship" between the state
police protection authority and the victim, there is no general
duty to provide an individual with such protection. 2 In 1982, the
' See Gittler, supra note 5, at 129-30 (explaining evolution of American public prosecu-
tion system).
8 See Aynes, supra note 3, at 72 (noting that state served as surrogate of victim); see also
ROBERT REIFF, THE INVISIBLE Vic-rim 134-35 (1979) (discussing how crime against person
became crime against state).
• See Gittler, supra note 5, at 132-33 (explaining decline of restitution).
15 See id. at 133 (discussing development of penitentiaries in early America).
l' Deborah P. Kelly, Victims' Perceptions of Criminal Justice, II PEPP. L. REv. 15, 15
(1984). The article is based on over 100 personal interviews with crime victims and pro-
poses reforms in the criminal justice system. Id.
" See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197-200
(1989) (explaining that state owes affirmative duties of care and protection in limited cir-
cumstances, such as incarceration, institutionalization, or other instances evidencing re-
straints on personal liberty); see also Martinez v. California, 440 U.S. 277, 285 (1980) (no
[Vol. 8:177
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United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit declared,
in part, that "there is no constitutional right to be protected by
the state against being murdered by criminals or madmen."'
This position is intolerable and is not supported by our legal
heritage or by the United States Constitution. In fact, it has been
observed that the wholesale expansion of " 'the rights of criminal
defendants may violate the United States Constitution,' because
they may hamper law enforcement efforts to provide a minimal
level of protection" to the law abiding." Today, it is common to
hear complaints that suspects involved in serious, and sometimes
violent, crimes are back on the streets, ready to strike again, even
before the arresting officers have finished their reports. People
feel that there is slight truth to "truth-in-sentencing" and that
there is a reason why it is called the criminal justice system.
A strong argument can be made that ordinary citizens, along
with participatory rights in the criminal process, should receive
the same protections that criminals do."6 It is precisely to these
tasks that the victims' rights movement addresses itself."6 It is
neither an anti-defendants' rights movement, nor an attempt to
undermine the strength and fairness of the criminal justice pro-
cess. The victims' rights movement does, however, advocate a re-
examination of the victim's place vis-a-vis both the government
and its duty to protect and to include victims as parties in interest
with standing of their own.
In fact, under what is known as the "restitutive" theory of jus-
tice, victims and defendants are the central players in the criminal
duty of protection owed by parole board to murder victim because parolee-murderer was
not agent of state).
"8 Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982); see also Aynes, supra note 3, at
66 (" 'government and its agents are under no general duty to provide ... police protec-
tion to any particular individual citizen' ") (quoting Warren v. District of Columbia, 444
A.2d 1, 4 (App. D.C. 1981)).
" Aynes, supra note 3, at 76-77 n.61 (quoting Andrew R. Willing, Protection by Law En-
forcement: The Emerging Constitutional Right, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 85 (1982)); see also Will-
ing, supra, (discussing threat of violating Constitution through expansion of criminals'
rights).
1" See Aynes, supra note 3, at 92. "It is somewhat ironic that one suspected or convicted
of a crime ... enjoy[s] the right to receive physical protection from the government while.
• . a law-abiding resident is said not to be entitled to such protection. Id. The argument is
that "the protection due to ordinary people should be elevated at least to the same level
provided to suspected or convicted criminals." Id.
" See Gittler, supra note 5, at 118-25 (discussing goals of victims' rights movement,
which include greater role of victim in criminal process, protection against intimidation,
and overall better treatment of victims and witnesses).
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justice process, while the prosecutor functions as mediator and en-
forcer of any judgment. 17 Since the offender has violated the vic-
tim's rights, the criminal justice system serves to rectify the harm,
or imbalance, that such violation has caused between these two
parties."
The Declaration of Independence provides that the purpose of
government is to secure inalienable rights which include life, lib-
erty, and the pursuit of happiness. The Constitution imposes a
duty upon the government to protect these rights for everyone.19
In return for this protection, the citizen promises allegiance to the
government."0 Further, the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
no state shall "deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."'" As early as 1871, the Fourteenth
Amendment was interpreted as prohibiting the denial of equal
protection of the laws " '[by] the omission to protect, as well as
the omission to pass laws for protection.' ,22
A woman calling 911, for instance, should never be told that
law enforcement will respond only after her former husband, who
is already under court order to stay away, is known to have a gun,
and has informed her that he is going to kill her, actually arrives
at her home. In this Los Angeles case, the ex-husband was true to
his word. When the second call was made to 911 seven minutes
later, the woman and three other family members were dead. A
victim should never, as happened recently in San Diego, be told
by the prosecutor's office that there are just so many dollars with
which to bring charges of rape, and that her case was not good
enough to qualify.23 Terrified parents searching for their child
should never be told that nothing can be done until after the first
17 Id. at 138 n.70 (under restitutive theory, state's role is limited to mediating dispute
and enforcing judgment).
1S Id. at 138 (discussing respective roles of victim, defendant, and state pursuant to resti-
tutive theory of criminal justice).
", U.S. CoNsT. amend. V, § 1. "No person shall be .. .deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law ...." Id.
20 See Aynes, supra note 3, at 75-77 (discussing theory of social contract and govern-
ment's duty to its citizens).
21 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Aynes, supra note 3, at 77-84 (setting forth
protections mandated by Fourteenth Amendment).
22 Aynes, supra note 3, at 84 (quoting United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79, 81 (C.C.S.D.
Alaska 1871) (No. 15,282)).
" This was a case handled by the California Crime Victims Legal Clinic. The victim
decided not to press forward with the case. I was prepared to go public, since the prosecu-
tor's behavior was unacceptable. The victim moved to another city.
[Vol. 8:177
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24 hours. In this case, which drew national attention because the
killer was subsequently identified as an on-duty California High-
way Patrol officer, family members discovered the body of the
missing child after a night of searching during which three sepa-
rate law enforcement patrol units refused them assistance. 4
These case scenarios are fairly typical. Taken together, they re-
flect the wholesale omission by the government to protect its citi-
zens through the enactment of either law or policy, which is by
any measure equal to that afforded the accused. Were this any
other contract, it would certainly have been declared null and
void.
It has been argued by opponents of victims' rights that the Con-
stitution was designed only to define the boundaries of govern-
mental power, not to mandate its action.2 If we were to accept
this interpretation, then today's devastating effect of crime on so-
ciety was unanticipated by the framers of the Constitution.
If there is a solution within the federal Constitution to re-estab-
lish a balance between the criminal and the victim, how should it
be done? .While the answers are not simple, neither are they as
nebulous as the naysayers allege.
The most commanding resolution to an imbalance of rights be-
tween the defendant and the victim of a crime is the implementa-
tion of a federal constitutional amendment, which would grant
standing to crime victims separate from that of the prosecutor and
defendant. Under this plan, victims would have no special privi-
leges and would have to use the same rule book as the other play-
ers. The evidence code, case law, and legislative interpretation
could be used to strengthen the victim's position in the same man-
ner as is currently available to the other parties.
Among the obstacles preventing the passage of such a federal
constitutional amendment is the alarming lack of candor by those
in the criminal justice system who purport to back these amend-
ments at the state level. There is a saying in the law which holds
that a right without a remedy is no right at all. For the most part,
these hollow rights have been enshrined in the many so-called vic-
People v. Peyer, San Diego Sup. Ct., Case # F101454 (1988). This was also a case in
which I represented the victim's family. The first trial ended in a hung jury. The family
and I went to the District Attorney regarding a second trial, which resulted in a conviction.
"6 See Joseph Perkins, Victim's Rights: America's Crime Victims Deserve to Be Heard, JUSTICE
REPORT, Winter 1993, at 6 (discussing imbalance of constitutional rights favoring accused).
1992]
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tims' bills of rights which have found their way into state constitu-
tions over the past decade. 6 At best, they serve as mere guidelines
which do little more than patronize victims with rhetoric and illu-
sory promises. While some indirect benefits do trickle down to
crime victims, they are quite secondary to the power shift occur-
ring between the defendant and the prosecutor.
In 1990, California passed Proposition 115, popularly known as
the Crime Victims Justice Reform Act. 7 In addition to the com-
plete absence of any shift of participatory power to the victim, the
enactment of this legislation did strip from attorneys the right to
conduct voir dire in the jury selection process.28 However com-
mendable this may be for the curtailment of endless questions put
to jurors by defense attorneys, it seriously compromised the ability
of both prosecutors and plaintiffs' civil litigators to identify and to
eliminate defendant-biased jurors. This selection process becomes
critical in high visibility cases and in those which engender bias,
including sexual assault, child molestation, and domestic violence.
In California, crime victims are allowed by law to make a victim
impact statement at the sentencing stage of a criminal case.2 9 Fur-
thermore, they may appear either in person or by counsel.30
There is, of course, a catch. This law is not part of the Victims'
Bill of Rights which was incorporated into the California Constitu-
tion in 1982.1 Rather, it is codified in the Penal Code,32 and
therefore is not protected by or enforceable on constitutional
"' See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b); MICH. CONST. art. I,
§ 24; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23.
" See Crime Victims Justice Reform Act, Initiative Measure Proposition 115 (approved
June 5, 1990) (codified at CAL. CONST. art. I §§ 14.1, 24, 29, 30; CAL. EviD. CODE § 1203.1
(West Supp. 1992) (new); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 223, 223.5 (West Supp. 1992) (new);
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 189, 190.2, 190.5, 859, 866, 872 (West Supp. 1992) (as amended);
§§ 190.41, 206, 206.1, 871.6, 964.1, 987.05, 1049.5, 1050.1, 1054, 1054.1, 1054.2,
1054.3, 1054.4, 1054.5, 1054.6, 1054.7, 1385.1, 1511 (West Supp. 1992) (new); 1102.5,
1102.7, 1430 (West Supp. 1992) (repealed)). Proposition 115 was enacted by a vote of the
California electorate on June 3, 1990.
2' CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 223 (West 1992) (providing that in criminal cases, court shall
conduct voir dire of prospective jurors).
" See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1191.1 (West 1992) (providing for victim impact statement at
sentencing proceeding).
so Id.
" See Victims' Bill of Rights, Initiative Measure Proposition 8 (approved June 8, 1982)
(codified at CAL. CONST. art. I §§ 12, 28 (repealed); § 28 (new); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 25,
667, 1191.1, 1192.7, 3043 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992) (new); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§§ 1732.5, 1767, 6631 (West 1984) (new)). In California the so-called Victims' Bill of
Rights was passed by initiative as Proposition 8 in June 1982.
" See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1191.1 (providing for victim impact statement at sentencing).
[Vol. 8:177
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grounds. Most likely this was not an accident or oversight. Once
again, there is only the illusion of justice.
In 1987, the first case dealing with the right to present a victim
impact statement was addressed by the United States Supreme
Court. The case, Booth v Maryland," was a brutal double-homi-
cide.34 In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court determined
that a victim impact statement was too prejudicial to the defend-
ant in a death penalty case, and could not be overcome by a rele-
vancy argument.38 In other words, the harmful effects of the mur-
der on the victims' family were held to be unacceptable
considerations during sentencing.
Not since the close of the Civil War have the ties that bind the
law-abiding in this country to their government been so close to
complete collapse. Far from being melodramatic, this observation
is supported by a sharp increase between 1988 and 1990 in the
public's perception, as compared to the reality, of the increased
risk of victimization."6 There were other factors influencing this
statistic, but the common theme remaining today is one of lost
trust and credibility.
Then, in 1990, in what has been called by some a 'surrender' to
the pressures of militant crime victim groups and their supporters,
and by others as a first step toward a just redistribution of rights
between criminals and their victims, the Court reversed itself.
The Supreme Court decided Payne v. Tennessee 37 and allowed vic-
tim impact evidence admitted during the sentencing phase of a
trial." Justice Thurgood Marshall penned a scathing dissent in
Payne, condemning his brethren for abandoning legal precedent. 9
This is a weak argument from a jurist who himself changed our
nation by abandoning legal precedent. Separate but equal had
seemed so firmly supported by constitutional interpretation before
Marshall argued Brown v. Board of Education."' How clearly wrong
" 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
" Id. at 497-98.' Booth and an accomplice entered the home of an elderly couple and
robbed, gagged, and stabbed them to death. Id.
" Id. at 509. The Court held that a victim impact statement at the sentencing phase of a
capital murder trial violated the Eighth Amendment. Id.
" See America Speaks Out, supra note 1, at 3-5 (giving statistics of actual criminal incidents
and statistics regarding citizens' fear of crime).
7 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
" Id. at 2609-10.
39 Id. at 2619.
,0 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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his predecessors had been, he convincingly argued.
How is it now so different to hold violent offenders morally ac-
countable for their actions and allow a jury to consider victim im-
pact evidence a factor when deciding a capital murderer's fate.
Payne had brutally murdered a young mother and her daughter
in front of the mother's three-year-old son. 1 The boy, too, had
been seriously injured. 2 During the penalty phase of the trial, the
surviving child's grandmother testified about the nightmares and
fear suffered by the surviving boy, and described how he cried out
in the night for his dead mother.'
With the Payne decision, there is now a starting point from
which to begin meaningful victim participation at the sentencing
hearing. It is, however, just a starting point. In all but death pen-
alty cases, Payne has little influence. As with other "rights," there
are neither penalties for failure to notify victims of the sentencing
date, nor barriers to proceeding in their absence. In California, a
recent study revealed that fewer than three percent of eligible vic-
tims avail themselves of the opportunity to make a victim impact
statement.44 Although some have no interest in facing the of-
fender and want nothing to do with the case, my experience
strongly suggests that the lack of advocacy and support for crime
victims keeps them away from the courthouse on judgment day.
Legal counsel for crime victims must stretch the boundaries of
current laws and learn to think more like criminal defense attor-
neys in the pursuit of new horizons. By exploring the language of
a state's victim impact statement statute, a victim's attorney can
present his/her case more strongly. In California, a victim has the
right to appear "personally or by counsel" to address the appro-
priate issues.4" Does this mean that only one or the other may be
heard? Or that a lay victim advocate or certified law student
would not qualify? I have used them all, and have almost never
been challenged.
41 Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2601-02 (1991).
42 Id. at 2602. The child was stabbed repeatedly, but miraculously survived. Id.
13 Id. at 2603.
"" See EDWIN VILLMOARE & VIRGINIA V. NETO, NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, ViCTIM APPEARANCES AT SENTENCING UNDER CALIFORNIA'S VICTINMs' BILL OF RIGHTS,
RESEARCH IN BRIEF 1, 2 (1987) (stating statistics regarding victims' concerns with, and par-
ticipation in, prosecution of case).
"6 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1191.1 (West 1992) (victim has right to appear at sentencing
proceeding "personally or by counsel").
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We have learned not to hand out copies of victim impact state-
ments until the case is actually called and all parties appear ready
to proceed. Early on, these statements were distributed before the
judge took the bench. As often as not, the hearing was continued
and the full impact of the statements had been squandered by the
time the sentencing actually took place. For much the same rea-
son, the probation report should advise the court that a victim will
appear to present an impact statement. However, the statement
should not be attached to the report.
A victim's attorney should encourage the judiciary to consider
what limited victims' rights are available. If the victim or a repre-
sentative is not present when the case is called, the court should
conduct an inquiry on the record to determine what efforts were
made, and by whom, to notify the right parties about the sentenc-
ing. If the court is satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence
that the victim's absence is knowing and voluntary, the hearing
will proceed. However, if the court was misinformed or misled,
suggested remedies include sanctions and a sentencing de novo.
I am particularly interested by the word "counsel" in Califor-
nia's victim impact statute.4 6 If, as it seems to suggest, a crime vic-
tim has the right to counsel at a sentencing hearing, then it would
seem to follow that this right begins upon the court's acceptance
of the entered plea. Everything from that point on concerns sen-
tencing. Therefore, I respond as an attorney of record in regard
to any proceedings post-plea. I accompany other counsel into
chambers, I request probation reports, and, sometimes I ask that
the prosecutor direct communication with the victim through me.
This last request prevents a prosecutor from undermining client
control, and from not allowing victims to maximize their influence
at the appropriate times and places.
I have experienced the least success in securing probation re-
ports prior to sentencing. This scenario will probably lead to a test
case on the meaning of "counsel" as it is used in the California
statute. I agree with attorney John Stein, Deputy Director of the
National Organization for Victim Assistance, that this provision
probably makes the victim a recognized party of interest through-
out the sentencing phase of the criminal case, and, therefore,
gives the victim a "due-process right to examine the [Pre-Sen-
46 Id.
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tence Investigation Report] in preparation for the hearing." '47
Should it be determined that a victim has standing during the sen-
tencing phase of a criminal case, what might the effect be on pro-
ceedings at earlier stages of the case?
In the summer of 1989, I had the opportunity to participate in
a day-long working session on victim participation in the criminal
justice process. The session held in Washington, D.C. was hosted
by Justice Fellowship, a project of Prison Fellowship. Prison Fel-
lowship was founded by Charles Colson, a former aide to the
Nixon White House. Another expert in attendance was Professor
Abraham Goldstein from Yale Law School, who had been one of
the earliest advocates of victim participation in the criminal
arena.
48
The purpose of the session was to examine a legal concept
which Prison Fellowship referred to as "Restorative justice." Al-
though established within a moderately religious framework, the
proposed definition was not at all limited by this orientation. "Re-
storative justice acknowledges the importance of the government's
contribution to the justice process but places equal weight on vic-
tims, offenders, and the community taking active roles. It ad-
dresses the harm sustained by all the parties and underscores their
responsibilities to one another. It brings criminal justice back into
balance."4
9
When we had completed our session, Justice Fellowship devel-
oped the following principles:
- The victim should have access to representation separate
from the prosecutor for those stages of the criminal process
that relate to the victim's pursuit of restitution or personal
protection.
- The decision to prosecute should normally rest with the
public prosecutor.
- Sentencing should be constructed so as to increase the
41 John H. Stein, D.A. Fighting Ethical Reprimand for Practicing Victim Rights, NOVA NEWS-
LETTER (Nat'l Org. for Victim Assistance, Wash., D.C.), Mar. 1988, at 5.
48 Professor Goldstein is the Sterling Professor of Law at Yale University. He graduated,,
from Yale Law School in 1949 and has written numerous articles on victims' issues. For an
interesting discussion on victim participation in the criminal justice system, see generally
Abraham S. Goldstein, Defining the Role of the Victim in the Criminal Prosecution, 52 Miss. L.
REV. 515 (1982).
49 DANIEL W. VAN NESS ET AL., JUSTICE FELLOWSHIP, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: THEORY 32
(1989).
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likelihood of restitution being paid. In other words, restitu-
tion should be normative unless there is a compelling, over-
riding reason.
- Rights given to victims should not diminish the defend-
ant's rights or limit the prosecutor's right to protect the pub-
lic interest.
- The right to counsel available to a crime victim in the
civil process should also be available to the victim in the crim-
inal process.50
This was the first list I had seen which treated crime victims
separately and distinguished them from their more common roles
as a witness or an element of the crime, or even worse, as the
body on a coroner's report.
These principles lead to a most intriguing, yet seemingly sensi-
ble, conclusion. Crime victims should have legal counsel of their
own. The public prosecutor's absolute discretion and monopoly
over the initiation or progress of a criminal prosecution is not an
inevitable feature of a fair judicial system. While prosecutors have
been at the forefront of the victims' rights movement, and many
have demonstrated great sensitivity to the interests of crime vic-
tims, they will be the first to acknowledge that they only represent
the state.
The interests of the state, with respect to the initiation of prose-
cution, the offenses charged, the negotiation and acceptance of
guilty pleas and sentence recommendations, may be dramatically
different from the victim's interests. The dismissal of counts in a
multi-count complaint may compromise a victim's right to be com-
pensated by the state restitution fund, since outright dismissal may
lead to the conclusion that a crime was not committed. Collection
of insurance benefits, as the result of an auto crash, may be diffi-
cult if a defendant is allowed to plead guilty to one of two pending
drunk driving cases, with the second being dismissed. In Califor-
nia, a restitution order made as part of a plea to a felony can be
filed as a civil judgment.51 This is not true if the plea is reduced to
a misdemeanor. In addition, a guilty plea in a criminal case may
be introduced in a civil action based on the same facts, without
" THOMAS CRAWFORD, ET AL., JUSTICE FELLOWSHIP, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: PRINCIPLES 68-69
(1990).
"1 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1214(b) (West 1992) (order of restitution may constitute civil
judgment enforceable in same manner as money judgment).
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any further need to prove liability. If, however, the plea is a nolo
contendre, liability must be proven before evidence of damages is
addressed.
Probably the most disastrous example in my career of how the
handling of a criminal case can impact a civil action based on the
same facts, is playing out as I prepare this paper. I received a tear-
ful call from a client whose case had made headlines over five
years ago. The victim, a woman, had been savagely kicked in the
face by a member of the Navy's SEAL team. Her face was perma-
nently scarred, and she had to undergo several painful surgeries.
On the date of the incident, the defendant harassed the victim by
making lewd and suggestive comments to her. He eventually
pinched her backside when she walked by him. She slapped his
face. He knocked her to the ground and kicked her in the face
with the heel of his boot. The defendant received a relatively mi-
nor sentence, with a promise that, upon successful completion of
five years' probation, his record could be expunged.
The victim had filed a civil suit, but the defendant managed to
stall for the entire five year length of his probation. Then, one
day last summer he went to court and had his case dismissed.
Neither the judge, nor the original case prosecutor, nor the vic-
tim's civil attorney, knew what had happened until after the dis-
missal. Now, instead of simply introducing the felony conviction as
proof of liability and moving straight to damages, this victim may
have to prove the case de novo. Jurors may be influenced by the
fact that this crime took place in a bar, and that the victim some-
how deserved what she got because she slapped the defendant.
This could adversely affect the award of damages. We are cur-
rently looking for a flaw of some kind in the record, which could
persuade the court to reinstate the charges long enough to get the
civil case to trial.5 2
There are, of course, good days at the office. The president of
the local chapter of Mothers Against Drunk Driving ("MADD")
telephoned me when she was subpoenaed by a criminal defense
attorney who was trying to prove that pressure on the court by
MADD members had resulted in the filing of murder charges in
62 In March 1993, following court rulings preserving the right to introduce the criminal
disposition to prove liability, a jury returned a six-figure judgment in favor of the victim.
The defendant immediately filed for bankruptcy and will discharge this obligation.
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cases involving primarily Hispanic defendants. She had just spo-
ken to the prosecutor in the criminal case, and had been advised
not to look to his office for legal advice. He, too, had been sub-
poenaed by the defense, and was being represented by the Office
of the Attorney General. She stated that she probably would ap-
pear because she didn't know what else to do. I explained that an
appearance under these circumstances could set a dangerous pre-
cedent. Therefore, I appeared for her and had the subpoena
quashed.
In another case, the defendant, already convicted for murder
and serving prison time, sued everyone in the criminal justice
chain, including the victim. Over the course of these proceedings,
he had become a very good "jailhouse lawyer." The original case
prosecutor informed the victim that he was represented by the At-
torney General, the police department was represented by the
City Attorney, and the judge was represented by the County
Counsel. Unfortunately, the victim had no representation. For the
next eighteen months, I made'six appearances on behalf of this
victim. She could not understand how she had been the chief
prosecution witness, and later did not receive any assistance from
the system for something which directly resulted from her willing-
ness to testify.
Indeed, there is a very real possibility that prosecutors violate
the Canon of Ethics when they purport to represent both the in-
terests of the state and the interests of the victim in the same case.
A potential conflict of interest arises between these competing in-
terests. In such serious circumstances, a lawyer "should resolve all
doubts against the propriety of the representation. A lawyer
should never represent in litigation multiple clients with differing
interests; . . . . -53 "This problem arises whenever a lawyer is
asked to represent two or more clients who may have differing
interests, whether such interests be conflicting, inconsistent, di-
verse, or otherwise discordant." '
The first dramatic example of the legal dilemma presented
when a prosecutor for the state doubles as a lawyer for the victim
occurred in Oregon in 1988.55 John Collins, the elected District
a' MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-15 (1983).
Id. at EC 5-14.
"' See In re Collins, 775 P.2d 312, 313-14 (Or. 1989) (in banc) (case involved conflict
between District Attorney and how he managed his crime victims' assistance program); see
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Attorney of rural Yamhill County, directed an advocate in his vic-
tim assistance program to review the contents of what he believed
to be a defense-biased presentence report with the survivors of a
victim killed by a drunk driver. 6 The victim had been killed in an
early morning crash, when the defendant, who later showed a 1 1
blood alcohol level, ran a stop sign.57 The victim's children were
not even mentioned in the presentence report, nor was there an
accurate enumeration of the defendant's assets, including equity
in a house, from which restitution could have been paid. 8
The presentence report was given by Mr. Collins to a represen-
tative of the prosecutor-based victim assistance program, who in
turn read parts of it to the victim's family. This, of course,
brought up yet another issue. Should victim/witness programs
ever be based in any agency considered to be in the criminal jus-
tice loop, such as a probation or police department, or a prosecu-
tor's office, where the agency's interests potentially conflict with
the victim's?
The Oregon State Bar issued a letter of ethical reprimand, find-
ing that Mr. Collins violated the Code of Ethics by condoning the
disclosure to the victim's family of the presentence report beyond
the victim impact statement and the sentencing recommenda-
tion. 9 According to the Oregon State Bar, Mr. Collins, through
the victims' advocate worker in his office, made this information
"available" to people not designated by statute as proper recipi-
ents of such information. 0
also Stein, supra note 46, at 1 (discussing details of this "landmark legal ethics case affect-
ing victims' rights").
See Collins, 775 P.2d at 313-14. According to Oregon law, the availability of a defend-
ant's presentence report is limited to the sentencing court, the Department of Correction,
the State Board of Parole, appellate or review courts, the district attorney, the defendant
or defendant's counsel. Id. at 313 n.l. Despite this statute, D.A. Collins instructed his vic-
tim advocate to review the victim impact portion of the defendant's presentence report
with the victim's wife. Id.; see also Stein, supra note 46, at 1 (same).
"' See Stein, supra note 46, at 1. The accused was apparently "fatigued" from being up
all night, playing in a band and partying afterwards. Id. He was driving with a blood alco-
hol content of 0.11 when he ran a stop sign and collided with the victim's car. Id.
" Id. at 2. The advocate from the victim assistance program wrote a letter to the judge
rebutting some of the presentence report's findings and recommendations. Id.
6, See Collins, 775 P.2d at 313 (lawyer disciplinary proceeding brought by Oregon State
Bar against Collins for disclosing information in presentence report); see also Stein, supra
note 46, at 5 (same).
. See Collins, 775 P.2d at 313. The Oregon State Bar's trial panel found that Collins did
not violate the Oregon statute in question nor the disciplinary rules. Id. at 312. On appeal
by the Bar to the Oregon Supreme Court, the trial panel's decision was affirmed. Id. How-
ever, the decision was based solely on the rather dubious ground that Mr. Collins passed
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Presentence reports are considered confidential and at one time
were available only to the court. Today offenders can challenge
report findings and recommendations. As in the Oregon case, vic-
tims are often finding these reports biased against their interests,
dealing ineffectively with matters of great adverse consequence to
them. How can victims' counsel adequately prepare to fully re-
present the interests of their clients without access to the same
information provided to the other participants? At least in states
like California, where victims are by statute allowed legal repre-
sentation at the sentencing hearing, a constitutional challenge
needs to be mounted on behalf of victims for equal access to all
materials upon which the sentencing is to be decided. Of particu-
lar importance is information concerning offender assets, which
are crucial to the restitution hearing.
If handled by an attorney with a good grasp of their state's res-
titution laws, a civil attorney retained for the tort claim can prove
unlimited pecuniary damages at the sentencing hearing in the
criminal case, and subsequently have the order filed as a civil judg-
ment. These same attorneys should try appearing as early as the
first bail hearing to advise the court that care should be taken to
preserve the offender's assets so that when the sentencing finally
takes place, sometimes years later, there will still be assets to sat-
isfy any orders for restitution.
One of the common responses to victims who are demanding
more rights in the criminal justice system is that they should be
looking to the civil courts where money damages can be awarded.
Again, it appears that we have come to accept as some sort of
universal truth the current system of separate venues for criminal
and civil cases."1 A single forum to decide all the issues presented
by a case makes much more sense in these times of massive court
congestion and recessive economic doldrums. As Josephine Gittler
has so wisely observed:
Whatever the significance and wisdom of the traditional dis-
tinction between the punishment of criminal offenders
the information by having it read to the victim rather than allowing her to see an actual
physical copy of the report. Id. at 315-16; see also John H. Stein, D.A. Collins Wins Ethics
Ruling But Faces Supreme Court Appeal, NOVA NEWSLETrER (Nat'l Org. for Victim Assis-
tance, Wash., D.C.), Aug. 1988, at 6-7 (discussing court's distinction between making
presentence report information "available" and "revealing" information).
e See Gittler, supra note 5, at 137-40 (discussing merger of criminal and tort law).
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through the criminal law and the compensation of crime vic-
tims through civil tort law, as a practical matter, the wide ac-
ceptance and use of restitution within the criminal justice sys-
tem has already resulted in the partial merger of criminal and
tort law.62
Today, more than ever before in American history, the avenue
to money damages through civil litigation is threatened. A na-
tional trend seems under way, mostly through the initiative pro-
cess and often propelled by the insurance industry, to curtail civil
damage dollars by placing limits on awards for pain and suffering,
passing no-fault insurance laws, and by limiting victim access to
legal representation through elimination of the contingency fee
system.
Victims need lawyers in the criminal justice system who will
treat them as their only clients and who will work to secure consti-
tutionally protected due process and equal protection rights, as
well as to initiate legislation at the state and national levels to se-
cure equal standing for their clients alongside prosecutors and
criminal defense attorneys. Crime victims need an established
method of access to the court in criminal cases when competing
interests reach an impasse. While this may not mean that three
lawyers will appear at the counsel table during a trial, it does
mean that a victim will have a chance to address critical issues,
some of which may be dispositive of the case, at a time when their
interests have not yet been compromised.
Crime victims need to know that their interests are being safe-
guarded by victim/witness programs which are independent of
any agency with potentially competing interests. They should ex-
pect that decisions made by state victim compensation boards are
subject to the same standards of due process and equal protection
afforded defendants in the court system or before other adminis-
trative agencies.
The victims' rights movement is one of the largest civil rights
movements in the country today. An immediate need exists for
lawyers to practice in this new field. Law school curricula must
offer courses and materials designed to educate future lawyers
about victims' rights issues and to encourage internships and
' Id. at 139.
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clerkships with a legal clinic that represents crime victims. Law
students should be encouraged to pursue a career in victims' liti-
gation, both within the criminal and civil justice arenas.
Crime victim interests need to be reflected in the filing of ami-
cus curiae briefs in appropriate cases throughout the justice sys-
tem. Victims should have access to lawyer referral panels covering
the myriad of issues which may be generated by an original crimi-
nal victimization. Many thorny constitutional issues remain to be
addressed, including the conflict between the public's right to
know and the victim's right to privacy, and further challenges to
the right of offenders to profit financially from their crimes.
This commentary can serve only to draw attention to the newly
emerging field of crime victim litigation, and to the legitimate
need for young lawyers, law schools, and the trial bar to consider
it "the stuff" from which careers are made. In this vein, I cannot
conclude without paying tribute to two outstanding individuals, at-
torney Frank Carrington and victim advocate Doris Tate. Al-
though they lived on opposite shores and thousands of miles
apart, they shared a common vision-that each is important to
the other. To that end, Mr. Carrington, often referred to as the
"Father of Victims' Rights," devoted countless hours to the crea-
tion of the first comprehensive training program for victim ser-
vice providers nationwide, and then saw the project funded in
1991 by the United States Department of Justice. Doris Tate,
mother of Manson family murder victim Sharon, devoted her con-
siderable energies to building strong crime victim coalitions and
took her message inside prison walls to some of the country's most
violent offenders, showing them that crime victims are real peo-
ple, have real families, and cry real tears.
We, too, cried real tears last year, when Frank Carrington and
Doris Tate died. They will be missed. To them, I dedicate this
commentary.
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